Revisiting Cognitive Theory

     When I first saw that we would be applying cognitive theory to narrative studies, I was thrilled. As a Psychology minor in undergrad, cognitive theory fascinated me. However, I was disappointed to see the application of it in our readings. Although Herman, Sternberg, Martinez, Gerrig, and Sunshine introduced very interesting concepts, it almost appeared as if they were all posing the exact same theory, only arguing over the reasons for this theory. They couldn’t seem to agree whether readers identify with narratives because they rely on preconstructed schema, they fit it into their personal constructions of possible selves, or they apply their inherent abilities to read people through actions and visual cues. As interesting as it was, I had trouble wrapping my head around one question: why does it matter?

     I had always adhered to the idea that cognitive studies were not just about how the mind works, but about what that means. For instance, when looking at how narrative is applied to psychological treatment and therapy, we see psychologists applying narrative theory with a constructive purpose. I thus expected to see narrative theorists apply psychology in the same manner. I was, however, disappointed. As fascinating as it was, why did it matter? If we do as Herman suggests and remove the author, the implied author, and the cultural context from the narrative, then why study it? Why does it matter without all of these things?

     In looking back over these texts, I found a ray of hope in the words of Sunshine (literally). She said something that gave me hope for merging cognitive theory with my desire for meaning: “Cognitive literary analysis thus continues beyond the line drawn by cognitive scientists—with the reintroduction of something else, a “noise,” if you will, that is usually carefully controlled for and excised, whenever possible, from laboratory settings” (“Theory of Mind and Experimental Representations of Fictional Consciousness” 284-5).

     Although cognitive theory does primarily attempt to isolate its study to “how” the mind works, Sunshine suggests here that it is not complete until it applies outside factors, or “noise” that furthers the analysis in an attempt to answer the question: Why does it matter? Thus, I suddenly began to see how cognitive theory is applied in multiple contexts, blending cultural, structural, and rhetorical theories with it, and creating analyses that use cognitive theory as a basis. In my own paper, for instance, I’ll be applying Kartunnen and Culler’s rhetorical theories of causality and naturalization, which are both concepts based on cognitive theory. I see now that it is only in knowing how the mind works that the idea of narrative as rhetoric is even plausible, or the application of narrative to cultural theory is possible. Cognitive theory by itself may have confused me, but it clearly supplies the basis for many other narrative theories, and is thus very productive for application.